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The paper develops a systematic reflection about 
the future of smart cites at the time of Covid-19, 
starting from an original periodization about the 
evolution of the concept of smartness, declined through 
a four fold analytical tool (technological, human-
social, institutional and spatial-environmental 
dimensions). Focusing on the role of smart citizens and 
on the “right to the city” concept, we list and critically 
appraise the emerging trends made visible by the 
worldwide sanitary crisis.  
1. Introduction  
This paper aims at developing a systematic but 
innovative reflection on a long established, but always 
evolving topic, such as the future of smart cities (SC). 
We believe it was a needed effort after more than two 
decades of debates around the concept of smartness – 
declined either as more technological or human – and 
the more recent and intertwining stream of research on 
the sharing economy. Yet, today, an urgent and 
mandatory reflection is needed upon the pandemic’s 
implications we still are discovering. Therefore, we 
build an original theoretical and methodological 
framework that will sustain and guide us through the 
contribution that is divided in two parts: the first offers 
a periodization of the evolving concept of SC while the 
second aligns it to those of citizenship and right to the 
city. Building on the most relevant literature on SC, we 
aim at updating and positioning the debate while 
developing an interpretative reading key for we might 
see in the near future. 
The first part will rely on, and also innovate, the 
tripartite analytical tool developed by Pardo and Nam 
[1]: to the technological, human and institutional 
dimensions we add a forth that relates to space and 
environment, while enlarging the human to a more 
comprehensive social dimension. We propose a three-
phase periodization analyzed through the lenses of 
these 4 dimensions. If for the first two phases we 
render and propose the debates developed over 25 
years based on data analyzed through an original 
systematic review, for the third phase we list, speculate 
and critically appraise the emerging trends made 
visible by the worldwide sanitary crisis. The second 
part of this contribution builds on the concept of smart 
citizenship offering an original angle tighten up to the 
concept of “right to the city”. Focusing on the role of 
citizens for the right to a (smart) city is especially 
urgent since we suddenly entered a third unplanned, 
not technologically driven, phase. Our contribution 
bears 3 points of originality: a novel periodization; the 
conceptualization of a “smart citizenship”; and the 
sketch of pressing problems for the “Post-pandemic” 
Smart City. 
2. The theoretical framework  
The concept of SC evolved and started to be 
applied as a normative and ideological claim without 
sufficient conceptual clarification on what it really 
means. The variety of SC narratives changes according 
to latitudes [2]: in the global North, the label is 
therefore adopted to redefine the existing urban 
infrastructure (often in parallel to a privatization of 
services and spaces), while in the global South it is 
used as a political frame for the construction of new 
cities through an increasingly government led 
technological urbanization. To set the table for our 
position paper we need to formulate a specific 
theoretical framework, building on Pardo and Nam [1] 
(for the first part), Dahrendorf [3] and Lefebvre [4] (for 
the second part). 
According to Pardo and Nam, understanding the 
phenomenon of SC, requires a multidimensional scope 
that looks beyond a technocratic and cyber-enthusiastic 
vision that matches the citizen centric neoliberal view 
of SC [5]. The novel approach distinguishes: a 
technology dimension relating to the implementation 
of infrastructures (especially ICT) to improve and 
transform life and work; a human dimension referring 
to people, education, and knowledge as key drivers for 
innovation and reconfiguration of existing processes; 
an institutional dimension calling for specific smart 
environment’s governance and policies to better design 





SC initiatives. However, previous analysis partially 
overlooked the spatial-environmental dimension that 
appears increasingly crucial in many definitions. 
Therefore, the concept of SC makes a strong reference 
to the theme of sustainability, to the point that its 
genesis is also traced back to the contents of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2005, and highlighted in subsequent 
documents like the Covenant of Mayors in 2008, where 
environmental sustainability is the primary objective of 
the SC [6]. At the same time, architects and urban 
planners increasingly mix SC design with spatial 
design and the creation of a “Sustainable User 
Experience (UX)" or" Green UX" [7]. The major 
contribution of this approach also lies in the suggestion 
for a multidisciplinary approach to the SC as a way not 
to "neutralize" the political dimension [8] inherent to 
the planning of intelligent urban spaces, shifting away 
from a neoliberal citizen-centric city that discourages 
agonistic spaces and active inclusive participation [9]. 
Building on this, we make a proposal for a novel 
periodization that accounts for Covid-19 unexpected 
changes (Section 3). 
The second part wants to focus on how the 
concepts of citizenship and the right to the city could 
be blended in a smart environment. Here, we rely on 
the distinction between provisions and entitlements 
advanced by the German sociologist Ralph 
Dahrendorf. We argue whether benefiting from a SC 
citizenship hinges on provisions or entitlements, 
calling into the field of an unequal structure of (digital) 
opportunities. In addition, we use Lefebvre’s radical 
concept of "right to the city", formulated to criticize 
liberal capitalism and its segregating effects on the 
urban environment. Since its concept does not have a 
legal but a performative meaning, we unveil possible 
social conflicts and contradictions within the dominant 
tech model of governance and management of SC that 
prevents a full and meaningful participation. 
Under this composite framework, we set out some 
compelling research questions such as: how did the 
debate on SC evolved over the last 25 years? What are 
the analytical dimensions that better grasp the turning 
points of this evolution? What is coming next? How 
does the concept of citizenship adapt to a smart 
environment? How does the right to city blend with it? 
3. Methodology 
We adopted a “systematic review method”, widely 
applied in social sciences and public policy evaluation 
studies [10].	We used different databases for review 
(Scopus and Web of Science) detecting peer-reviewed 
articles containing the terms ‘smart city/smart cities’ in 
the title from 1990 to 2018. We restricted the search to 
the Social Science subject area (SOCI for Web of 
Science and SSCI Index for Scopus). The	examination	
of	 the	 most	 accredited	 literature	 that	 tried	 to	
reconstruct	the	evolution	of	the	debate	on	the	smart	
city	 drove	 us	 to	 choose	 the	 presented	 time	
periodization.	 From this initial review, we first 
collected more than 743 articles, but only 466 articles 
really fit with the chosen subject area. After the 
exclusion of duplicates and articles that did not fit to 
our analysis, a sample of 364 articles was left. We 
added to this sample also official documents and 
reports from established institutions (like OECD), 
reaching 396 items. The T-LAB software allowed an 
analysis of the content through the co-occurrences of 
the words used to construct the concept map, clustering 
each group of words	 within the renewed theoretical 
frame of Pardo and Nam. Building on the systematic 
review and the most renowned contributions, we 
explore SC phenomenon as a “global discourse 
network” [11] proposing a novel periodization. Since it 
is premature to seek established scientific or 
institutional analysis, our efforts are oriented to offer 
an innovative interpretative analysis: our 
reconstruction of possible effects of the pandemic is 
mostly speculative but grounded on a critical reflection 
of events and political decisions that took place in the 
last year. Our goal is to trigger new ideas and analysis 
for a future research agenda and for innovative policy 
tools. Therefore, this position paper offers a first 
interpretative key about how to grasp the 
transformation and evolution of narratives and policies 
within the debate on smart cities. 
4. SC through time: from “prodromal” to 
“post-pandemic”? A proposal for 
periodization  
Building on the presented approach, we propose a 
periodization of SC evolution over time that considers 
four factors at the same time: technological, human, 
spatial-environmental and institutional. 
Acknowledging the still fuzzy nature of the concept of 
SC, and through the literature review, we envision a 
three stages time period through which it appeared, 
consolidated, concurred and, then, assimilated other 
emerging concepts (such as of sharing), and now it is 
opening to a new formulation. We refer to these 3 steps 
as "The Prodromal Smart City", "The Sharing City" 
and the "Post-Pandemic Smart City" (fig.1).  
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4.1 The “Prodromal” Smart City  
 
This first phase is a sort of early Nineties’ version 
of a tech-extractive urban utopia, which mainly feeds 
on the impulse of the high tech big players who began 
to building a precise imaginary. As increasingly urban 
centric, innovation is led by tech entrepreneurs fueled 
with the Californian ideology [12] that hybridizes 
participatory ideals, cyber-enthusiasm and economic 
liberalism.  
We can define it as a “prodromal” because it is the 
stage when the concept of SC begins to take shape, the 
first experimentations started to be relevant and 41% of 
related articles appeared stressing the technological 
dimensions through urban self-monitoring and self-
reporting. It is not surprising the origins of such debate 
were almost entirely attributable to the marketing 
strategy of IBM and other tech multinationals that see 
in the city a new market made of "complex networks of 
interconnected systems" that monitor and measure 
urban life, offering policy-makers more complete, 
reliable and robust data to make the best decisions 
[13]. IBM came out with a new concept and the “Smart 
Planet” service package, soon followed by other firms 
such as CISCO, Siemens and Ericsson. This new 
package was meant to supply governments with smart 
solutions focused mainly on transportation, 
communications, healthcare, energy and utilities. This 
promotional strategy culminated in the IBM project on 
the “Smarter Cities Challenge” started in 2010, a 
program that saw the company's experts providing 
numerous free consultations to municipal governments 
around the world. To date, IBM has offered its 
consultancy services, through the “Smarter Cities 
Challenge program”, to more than 130 cities 
worldwide, choosing from over 600 applicants. More 
than 800 IBM experts have offered free consultations 
and services for an estimated value of $ 68 million.  
This technocratic utopia has its symbol in the South 
of the world: Rio de Janeiro – as our review outlines – 
in 2009 launched the first large-scale SC project as 
well as the debate of sustainable development. In 
collaboration with Unicef and the Municipal 
Secretariat of Health and Civil Defense, this project 
focuses on the “smart favelas” where teenagers used 
kites and mobile technology to map the favelas' social 
and environmental hotspots, taking pictures of 
potential risks such as piles of rubbish, streets’ 
dangerous spots and hazardous electricity cables. The 
photos, tagged on a digital map, were used to detect 
urgency to respond. The project becomes an example 
of the "thaumaturgical" simplification of the 
potentiality of SC in an troubled urban environment. 
Another symbol is the Korean city of Songdo that, in 
collaboration with Cisco, wanted to become the model 
for the future of SC in Asia.  
The greatest attention is clearly on the 
technological dimension, focusing on a plurality of 
enabling technological artifacts understood as "digital 
infrastructure for communication and knowledge 
management" embedded in the urban space [14]. Here, 
the human dimension is understood as a 
complementary "infrastructure" because SC also needs 
smart people, their human capital, creativity and 
participatory orientation. Citizens are "intelligent" 
agents who use available skills to enjoy and reap off 
the benefits. Their representation oscillates between 
being consumers/users of city spaces and services, and 
being innovative entrepreneurs capable of exploiting 
the disruptive potential of a new urban paradigm. The 
human is more instrumental to SC rather than central to it, 
leading to exemplary failures such as that of Songdo. It 
became a gated town of expensive housing and 
international schools, stimulating regional and social 
imbalances that testify that this top down driven utopia 
bears troubles in the governance and stakeholder 
participation.  
The spatial-environmental dimension is strictly 
intertwined to environmental sustainability since it was 
the primary objective of initial SC’s formulations, 
although a strong technological determinism seriously 
undermined its originality. Furthermore, not 
considering the historical-identity dimension of spaces 
and activities totally underestimated the chances for 
alternative development paths or ignored embedded 
specificities within local economies.  
The institutional dimensions looks at the role of 
municipalities that, although amplifier and  
(financially) promoter of this urban vision, 
subordinated to the big tech players who provides 
advice, devices and knowledge in areas where public 
institutions are largely missing. In this embryonic 
phase, SC appears as a "commodified" urban space that 
legitimizes processes of extraction of value centralized 
in the hands of few private actors who possess 











4.2 The “Sharing” City 
 
 The economic crisis of 2008 put this narrative in 
crisis and critical views on the SC asked for its re-
configuration as also municipalities were looking for 
more reliable and contingent solutions. In 2013, a 
cover of the Economist launched the term "sharing 
economy", or a new digitally mediated peer2peer 
economy, emerging as a response to the 2007-2008 
economic crisis [15]. The narrative hybridizes the SC 
idea with a new solution, opening up to the second 
phase, the so-called “Sharing City” (2013-2020). The 
overlap of the two phenomena holds on some 
commonalities such as being urban phenomena, driven 
by connectivity and information technologies, and 
perceived as improving the quality of urban life through 
a localized community or active/productive citizen-
consumers. Almost one third of the articles about SC 
contain an explicit reference to the sharing phenomenon. 
Legitimation and impulse to change perspective are also 
supported by the emerging promises of a platform 
economy (experience like Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, Lyft) that 
grafted into the urban environment. The European 
Commission has strongly intercepted this idea with the 
launch of "The Sharing Cities program” that is defined 
as "a common approach to making smart cities a reality. 
By fostering international collaboration between industry 
and cities, the project seeks to develop affordable, 
integrated, commercial-scale smart city solutions with a 
high market potential". The Sharing Cities offers also a 
“framework for citizen engagement and collaboration at 
local level, thereby strengthening trust between cities 
and citizens”. 
Figure 2 compares the “prodromal” concept of SC with 
its evolution as “sharing city” through an examination 
of the keywords that emerge from the systematic 
review, organized along the four dimensions of 
analysis previously identified. Despite areas of 
profound complementarity, the two models retain some 
distinctive connotations. 
In the new sharing phase, the technological 
dimension becomes somehow implicit, focusing more 
on the relevance of the exchange processes "taking 
place in ways and on a scale not possible before the 
internet" [16]. In many cases, the reference to 
technology is assimilated into the platform 
conceptualization [17], understood not only as a device 
but as a new organizational system for innovative 
smart services. 
The human dimension becomes central and no 
longer instrumental. People represent the "raw 
material" of the "sharing city". It is no coincidence that 
the concept of sharing economy derives its strength 
from explicit references to the gift economy or 
literature on social networks [18]. The sharing services 
would be configured as a sui generis category of smart 
services, in which the human factor is essential and the 
platforms would appear as amplifiers of community 
exchanges. People not only own the exchanged assets, 
but often they are themselves the object of the 
exchange, as their frame their life inside and outside 
the platform.  
The spatial and environmental factor within the 
“sharing city” seems strongly related to the previous 
dimension and somehow interlinked to idea of sharing 
in itself as the enhancement and efficiency of idle 
capacities in an exchange system, of "underutilized 
assets, monetized or not, in ways that improve 
efficiency, sustainability and community" [19] 
empowered by digital technologies.  
As for the institutional dimension, the increasing 
relevance of the human and social factors led for 
developing new governance and regulatory approaches 
taking into greater account the cultural and social 
differences of each context. The public actor is 
somehow empowered, shifting from subordinated to 
enabler of collaborative networks, trying to reach a 
series of targets: developing a shared vision on the 
benefits of sharing among the urban community; 
promoting "shared" entrepreneurship and collaboration 
networks between different collaborative service 
providers; ensuring accessible technologies; engaging 
dialogue and guidance for the development of solutions 
and practices that respond to specific needs of the 
urban community. Areas of intervention can be 
variously traced in the principles contained in the 
Shareable Cities Resolution, signed by fifteen major 
cities of the United States, or in its European 
counterpart, the European Sharing Economy Coalition 
(EUROSHE). However, this coordination did not 
exclude a higher diversification of urban policies and 
approaches for the “sharing city” [20]: from the San 
Francisco model, promoting the Sharing Economy 
Working Group, a multi-stakeholder consultation 
system on urban policies to the European model, 
embodied by Amsterdam and Barcelona, centered 
more on co-designed audits for regulatory solutions 
that balance the benefits of sharing with the 
minimization of risks in terms of commodification, 
gentrification, or social exclusion; to the strongly top-
down Seoul model, where the public actor acts not 




Figure 2 –Comparing the Prodromal Smart City vs the Sharing City 
experiences capable of being credible alternatives to 
the bigger global players. The idea of a “sharing city” 
as an enhanced human-centric SC, claiming greater 
social inclusion and collaboration, started to lose its 
legitimacy as its positive social effects were critically 
questioned: gentrification effects (Airbnb); exploitation 
of work (riders and Uber drivers); inequalities in 
access and use to sharing services, rooted in social 
exclusion and homophilia of transactional networks 
(i.e. the case of digital time banks). Risks of value 
extraction, commodification processes and urban 
segregation are still evident. Furthermore, the 
economic sustainability is questioned by the crisis of 
the most relevant global players of sharing services in 
terms of return on investments (Car2go and 
BlaBlaCar), declining trust of investors (WeWork) as 
well as hard confrontation with public regulators 
(Airbnb and Uber). 
 
4.3 The “Post-pandemic” Smart City (2020 - ?) 
 
 The 2020 pandemic sanctions, in our opinion, the 
end of the “Sharing City” model, decreeing the 
emergence of a "temporary" model of urban space 
designed by technology but also new social models: 
the “Post-pandemic” Smart City. Covid-19 triggered a 
sudden and stringent reformulation of long-established 
social processes, whose general consequences are still 
under investigation (work and family relations; 
mobility, sociability among many others), definitely in 
need for specific comprehension when it comes to a 
smart environment. 
Considering the technological dimension, the 
relevance of the principle of physical distancing calls 
into question the opportunity of the previous model 
mainly based on interaction and sociability, while the 
use of smart and remote working, as a contingent 
solution, confines sociality back into a domestic 
dimension, even if strongly mediated by technology. It 
is an interconnected “empty” city where the 
technological dimension backlashes once again 
pivoting towards a stricter focus on the infrastructural 
networks and their capacity to support the increase in 
traffic caused by the Covid-19 emergency. 
Strengthening the digitalization of public and 
private services (from delivery, to e-commerce and 
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streaming, from electronic medical prescription to 
digital education or tax electronic payments) becomes 
a political priority, overcoming long-lasting processes 
of social and cultural resistance typically embedded in 
countries with a lower level of digital literacy or 
digitization (especially Mediterranean and Eastern 
European countries). Covid-19 forced us to turn to 
digital services without any significant concern about 
diversified skills and equipment among social groups 
and with reduced opt out possibilities, putting the 
digital divide again back at the center of policy issues. 
This massive switch to the digital has been 
accomplished without any regulatory mediation and 
without considering the emergence of social 
inequalities.  
Human and social dimension flattens on the focus 
on securitization, which also legitimizes the advent of 
control and contact tracing tech solutions. The political 
measures to contain individual freedoms lower the 
perception of alert with respect to the risk of violation 
of personal privacy. For example, in Taiwan, 
municipality used active mobile network monitoring to 
enforce home quarantine through a twice per day home 
call to verify that the quarantined have not abandoned 
their mobile device. Contact tracings apps –like 
Immuni in Italy or StopCovid in France – are other 
examples. Surveillance is one of the top issues for 
citizens: the technical infrastructures allow levels of 
recording, classification and control that are potentially 
limitless. 
Spatial and environmental dimension. The “Post- 
pandemic Smart City” (see table 1) is an “uninhabited” 
and vertically hyper-controlled city. However, as 
nature temporarily re-appropriates the urban space, the 
collapse of CO2 in major global cities (from Beijing to 
Milan) with the decrease in urban mobility highlights 
how environmental sustainability is not just a question 
of a more or less technological urban environment but 
it is heavily dependent on our economic-production 
model. New studies ascertain a microparticulate-
Covid-19 strong relationship and propose the urban 
agenda to maintain a 10 per cent drop in traffic 
volumes in the recovery phase to significantly improve 
their climate impact standing [21]. The “Post-
pandemic” smart city highlights how technology, 
sustainability and smartness can only be combined 
with a decrease of mobility and production activities.  
Institutional dimension. As for now, there is a 
revamp of the private-public partnership deemed an 
effective solution. The public actor (the State rather 
than the local municipality) negotiates collaboration 
agreements with companies in a non-transparent way, 
claiming its vertical power in an open conflict with the 
decentralized ambitions of the Global Smart Cities. 
The Chinese Model becomes the new benchmark: apps 
such as Alipay and WeChat flagged high-risk 
individuals, who were then quarantined or disallowed 
from entering public spaces. As normalcy returns, 
people are required to obtain a “green clearance” from 
these apps to be allowed back into public life and 
freely move. Datification of urban policies becomes a 
priority: in a recent interview Philip James, director of 
Newcastle Urban Observatory, argued how the Covid-
19 emergency demonstrated how having real time data 
in cities is crucial for urban well-being: the provision 
of hourly data (1.8 billion pieces of observational data 
gathered from 3500 active sensors across the city) 
proved how restrictions played out on the ground [22]. 
The “Post-pandemic” SC, despite its transitory model 
with distinctive characteristics (see table 1), already 
reveals a series of contradictions and taboos that 
requires close scrutiny: the infrastructural limits to 
access and load; the equipment differentiation and 
technological skills; the lack of awareness about the 
value of personal data and their economic exploitation; 
the imperfect compatibility between sustainability and 
smartness
 
Table 1.  A comparative exercise through the periodization, along the technological (1), human 
and social (2), spatial-environmental (3) and institutional (4) dimensions 
 Prodromal Smart City Sharing City Post -Pandemic Smart City 
1 Smart objects and devices 
embedded in the urban environment 
Sharing Platforms to enable new urban 
services 
Top Down transition to 
digital and tech surveillance 
2 Consumers or entrepreneurs of 
smart services 
Collaborative social networks Physical distancing and 
tech mediated relations 
3 Urban Space as a commodity Urban Space as an asset or a commons to 
share and manage collaboratively 
A decongested urban 
space environmentally relieved 
4    Smartness as a urban political 
vision influenced by big tech players 




Private-Partnerships for new 
data based Tech-solutions  
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 5. What role for (smart) citizens? 
 
Aiming at better qualifying the human dimension 
as intrinsically social, here we turn our attention to the 
actual inhabitants of a SC, because – as Shakespeare 
wrote – “what is the city if not the people?”. More 
generally, here, we want to build up the concept of 
“smart citizenship” upon the distinction between 
provisions and entitlements advanced by German 
sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf [2]. 
First of all, we should wonder what kind of citizen 
inhabits a SC enhanced by the ICT revolution, 
counting that the industrial revolution was a turning 
point for provisions (of goods) while the French 
revolution was a watershed for entitlements. In short, 
provisions are goods and services freely available on 
the market upon which citizens act their consumption 
choices while entitlements are individual rights to 
potentially choose and access those provisions. Their 
sum reflects the structure of opportunity accessible to 
individuals and social classes. This is strictly 
intertwined to the degree of freedom each society 
allows.  
Adapting it to our periodization, the “Prodromal” 
SC clearly puts an accent on the provisions, the 
“Sharing City” reformulates and enlarges the variety of 
provisions available and the “Post-Pandemic” city 
should eventually focus on the entitlements. As a 
matter of fact, choosing among an ample selection of 
goods and services characterizes more a “consumer” 
rather than a “citizen”: changes in the structure and 
processes of production and delivery through smart 
technological solutions could apparently democratize 
consumption opportunities (e.g. costs reduction), but 
could do nothing in terms of changing an unequal 
structure of opportunities to access those goods and 
services. That is to say, the SC does not change the 
entitlements structure, equivalent to a “ticket entry”, to 
those new provisions. More generally, the overall 
rhetoric of SC does not solve preexistent inequalities 
whether we look at access to housing, health and 
education services. Especially the “prodromal” phase 
ended up exacerbating what Dahrendorf calls the 
“Martinez paradox”1: a stark contrast between 
provisions without entitlements and entitlements 
without provisions. In our case, only citizens with the 
“right” (already privileged) entitlements could access 
                                                
1	 The	 anecdote	 refers	 to	 Dahrendorf	meeting	with	 Nicaragua’s	
ministry	 of	 Commerce	 in	 1986,	 Alejandro	 Martinez	 who	
defended	void	stacks	at	the	supermarket:	the	recent	’revolution’	




the new “smart” provisions. It is not surprise how the 
roadmap to the “smart city utopia” [23] typically 
started through coalitions of experts, consultants, city 
officials, and big tech companies, aiming at generating 
a (vague but) optimistic storytelling about the supposed 
benefits of SC. In parallel, the roadmap worked to 
construct an effective representation and bottom-up 
legitimation, even before a considering the real urban 
impact. In this discrepancy between vision and 
practice, especially at the initial stages, the role of 
citizens is limited to gathering opinions on what this 
"prototype" should be like. As a matter of fact, citizens 
have limited capacity and expectations about their 
involvement to radically influence the project, which is 
simply aimed at co-opting them for co-production, as 
shown in a Japanese study on the activation of smart 
communities [24]. 
Extending Dahrendorf reasoning and questioning 
whether the second “Sharing City” phase brought any 
changes, one could observe that the combination of a 
sharing economy narrative with the SC rhetoric 
obfuscated a substantial unmodified equilibrium. 
Where the focus is on the provision side (as the sharing 
economy literature teaches us), one may question 
whether there is a problem in equal opportunities to 
entitlements.  
Within the “sharing city” we find the same vision 
more oriented to co-production than to smart citizens-
led processes of deliberation. Although their role is not 
limited to mere consultancy for service design, it is 
intensely productive and even exploited. Without an 
adequate cultural and civic awareness counterweight, 
the access to sharing services is somehow unequal and 
their use results in new social conflicts: in several cities 
like Amsterdam, Paris or Bejing free-floated vehicle 
sharing systems do not represent an universalistic 
opportunity for mobility, have a high rate of vandalism 
and incorrect use (like in the 70s’ pre-technological 
experimentations), damaging both service providers (in 
terms of economic profitability), municipality (in terms 
of urban decorum) and users (in terms of efficiency of 
the service). The pandemic could be a wake-up call for 
the future of SC: the profound restructuring of 
economic, social and political processes in both urban 
and non-urban environments also paves the way to a 
reformulation of the fuzzy concept under investigation. 
Nowadays, we have sufficient knowledge for avoiding 
past errors and really design a SC where citizens are at 
its core. 
To answer the initial question in the light of the 
structure of opportunities the proposed periodization 
allows us to qualify the SC inhabitants as “people” 
rather than “citizens” in both the “Prodromal” and 
“Sharing” SC. A chance for modifying – or at least not 
deepening – existing inequalities is to develop a 
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framework for a “smart citizenship” – less focused of 
the consumer who access smart provisions in an 
unchanged entitlements structure – is to open to the 
“right to the city” literature. 
Lefebvre’s radical concept of "right to the city" to 
criticize liberal capitalism and its segregating effects 
on the urban environment, is still worthy to orient a 
progressive smart city policy. It could be declined as a 
right to act and participate as well as a right to use and 
accessibility. “The right to the city stresses the need to 
restructure the power relations that underlie the 
production of urban space, fundamentally shifting 
control away from capital and the state and toward 
urban inhabitants” [25]. The “Prodromal” SC is 
somehow similar to the urban environment criticized 
by Lefebvre in 1968: a segregating urban space, even 
more privatized and commodified, subordinated to 
private interests to extract and exploit the urban rent, 
limiting accessibility and right to participate within the 
urban space. The “Sharing City”, despite a brand new 
imaginary built on collaboration, reproduce the same 
inequalities both to access and participation within the 
city: examples are providing car sharing services only 
in areas of greater profitability and higher demand 
while applying the extra-tariff system to discouraging 
their use in peripheral areas or favoring central living 
spaces to the city user market through short term 
rentals more than to the housing needs of the 
inhabitants [26]. The “Post-pandemic” SC does not 
recognize any citizen's right to the city neither. On the 
one hand, the smart citizen must be contained, 
monitored and disciplined in a strongly top down 
manner, as cases such as that of London’s Tube show 
through constant monitoring and regulation through 
underground access data. On the other, the great 
current economic uncertainty questions the profitability 
of smart city investments. The controversial Toronto 
Waterfront and Sidewalk Labs project is now 
definitively stopped but it was scaled down thanks to 
Block Sidewalk campaign, a legal action launched over 
citizen rights that produced the privacy advisor to 
Sidewalk Labs resignation in 2018. 
For this reason we think that after the pandemic, the 
urban imaginary should consider the “right to the city” 
of its future smart citizen as a viable way to reconcile 
the four institutional dimensions of the SC paradigm. 
 
6. Conclusions: how could “smart 
citizens” really fit in the Post-pandemic 
SC? 
 
Since the modern age, social, technological and 
environmental developments are associated to a 
national or supranational entity while the last 50 years 
attribute the driver for innovation and sustainable 
development on the city. If the city turned from being a 
danger to be the solution to save the planet [27], one 
still needs to ponder on advantages and risks that such 
a change brings about for a SC. Table 2 summarizes 
and points to potential risks and opportunities in the 
debate over policies on SC after the pandemic. 
Covid-19 paved the way to identifying ‘new 
problems’ (such as the changing patterns of mobility, 
the restructuring of indoor and outdoor spaces such as 
schools, movie theaters and so on) calling for different 
urban governance strategies. If this is true, the concept 
of SC faces a double challenge. First, it should 
overcome some of its soft points by finding a balance 
among technological infrastructure solutions, top-down 
governance policies and the “forgotten” citizen (with 
its community). A possible triangulation is to be found 
in a mix of technology, organizational change and 
participation. Second, by doing so, this solution should 
fit in a continuously changing and adapting urban 
vision, independently from Covid-19. 
Solving this double challenge would also 
counteract two previous dangers highlighted when the 
SC is seen as the new actor in town for social, 
economic and environmental development. On the one 
side, there is a chance not to sell SC solutions as 
“natural” and “univocal”. On the other, the risk of a 
tech-centered single vision of SC should be 
substantially contained in the “Post-pandemic” SC 
compared to the “Prodromal” SC. 
Technological dimension. During the pandemic, the 
translation to smartness (education, training, working, 
sociality, etc) was fast and reactive, but in the “Post-
pandemic” SC it should be planned, aware and 
proactive through a regulatory effort to contain the 
dominant position of the most important high-tech 
players. As for now, the market sees a worrying 
dominance of few big players (GAFAM in Western 
countries or BATX in Asia) that exercise a control 
through their oligopolies because, for example, they 
enjoy the advantage of the first comers thanks to the 
stickiness and lock-ins of technology.  
As Zuboff [28] recently highlighted, capitalism has 
entered a new phase where is classical capitalistic 
dynamics (value extraction, market competition, 
consumer control) moved to ICT technology to fully 
grasp its potential for surveillance and 
commodification of the whole human experience. The 
value extraction imperative exploits the available 
technology to profit from data collected through 
smartphones, sensors, CCTV cameras, while 
transforming them into rents [29]. The triangulation 
between ubiquitous technology, business search for 
data and unaware citizen is on the plate to either be 
contained (if not solved) or exacerbated. 
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Table 2. Opportunities and risks in the evolution of the post pandemic SC paradigm 
Dimensions Opportunities Risks 
Technological Smart transition as a public and political 
target  
Strengthening tech oligopolies and 
infrastructural lock-ins 
Social Smart citizenship as the core Deepening social inequalities  
Spatial-Environmental Rethinking mobility and production for a 
“real” sustainable transition 
The Status quo “resistance”: hostility to 
radical change in behavior and attitudes 
Institutional  Deliberative democracy and (urban) open 
government data  
Political surveillance  
Human and social dimension. Main challenges 
are related to exacerbating existing inequalities 
coupled with a consumer/people vision of SC. Seeing 
people as an “infrastructure”, although relevant, does 
miss the point of transforming people/consumers into 
citizens. As it took time for other civil and social 
“rights” to consolidate, it will take its journey to 
develop a “smart citizenship”. A concrete peril is to 
continue with a biased “smart” urbanism and data-
driven governance that heavily affect and automate 
inequalities [30] [31], eroding citizens’ invisibility and 
privacy [32]. More specifically, a “Post-pandemic” 
city will not only rely on technology and “smart” 
urbanism but also on social policies intervening in 
rebalancing those entitlements and making access to 
SC more equal.  
 The focus on smart citizenship must become the 
heart of the “Post-pandemic” SC design. Recovering 
the lost "ethos" in the decline of the “Sharing city”, 
requires considerable efforts in the promotion of the 
ability to enhance the smart citizen's agency, not only 
as a consumer, co-producer or as service enabler, but 
also as a policy “hub” for urban planning. To do this 
we must start from citizenry, understood as the ability 
to exercise one's “right to the city”, working on tools 
and skills, but also on the social awareness of roles 
and commitments within the city. The public value of 
citizen data and the limitations to their use, such us 
the capability to develop a collective dimension of 
citizen voice [33] in the urban environment are core 
issues of this process as a way to guarantee both the 
“right of access” and “the right to participate”. Ratti 
and Claudel [34] propose a collaborative futurecraft 
in which deliberation, accessibility to knowledge and 
information, and co-production create the most fertile 
and useful ecosystem for a real smart city. 
Spatial-environmental dimension. The main 
challenges here are related to the interference 
between public and private space. The “onlife” way 
of living [35] could also represent the blurring 
between the top down (such as in the “post-
pandemic” SC) and the prosumer orientations for 
digitally centralized proactive urban governance. 
Smart citizens need more deliberative and 
collective tools, taking strength also by the new 
global and urban movements such as  “Occupy”, 
“Fridays for the future” or “Platform-cooperativism 
movement” that were already praising for this kind of 
change. Their contribution is also crucial for a true 
green transition, capable to question and challenge 
existing production models and imagine new ones 
(e.g. through the rediscovery of peri-urban 
agriculture, the organization of energy community 
cooperatives, the long and short distance carpooling 
models). The SC must be the ideal space for this 
concrete "social" innovation because it is rich in 
economic, cultural and social capital that can fuel this 
experimentation.  
Institutional dimensions. Main challenges relate 
to the role the public could embody. What role and 
vision should the public have? Why it should develop 
it? Not only a facilitator for bottom-up processes that 
are way to difficult to manage and sustain than just 
giving out money for “smart” initiatives. Its role 
should be propulsive, regulatory while empowering. 
On a continuum we have two opposite ideal cases: 
the first scenario sees government in active 
coordination with citizens to co-design smart 
initiatives for the public good while the second 
scenario sees the government manipulatively profit 
from potential for control. The USA and the EU have 
their differences but they project thoughtful and more 
cautious experiments while China is more audacious 
in launching a “social credit system”, heavily 
organized around control and surveillance. Around 
the world, the idea of smartness (and SC) is 
becoming an applied field for social control under the 
shield of surveillance offered by the technical 
infrastructure becoming more and more normalized 
and, thus, socially accepted. Covid-19 has 
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dramatically shown how under emergency 
circumstances the process of normalization spikes. 
We conclude by highlighting how difficult and 
critical is to develop a framework that really serves 
citizen empowerment. Previous SC schemes did not 
quite serve the purpose as they were only built 
around the magic bullet of “technology”. Technology 
could be effectively connected to citizens (and vice 
versa) without curtailing their rights and entitlements. 
Future schemes could benefit from a more diversified 
stream of research, going from technology to 
innovation, citizenship rights, co-created and co-
designed policy. There is a need for a shifting away 
from the “smart” city to the “smart” people, from 
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